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“POLLUTE FIRST, CONTROL LATER” NO MORE: 
COMBATING ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN 
CHINA THROUGH AN APPROACH BASED IN PUBLIC 
INTEREST LITIGATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Christine J. Lee† 
Abstract: As China continues to face severe environmental degradation as a side 
effect of torrid economic growth and rise in population, the Chinese government has 
promulgated numerous environmental laws over the past few decades to address this 
critical issue.  The efficacy of these laws, however, has been highly questionable.  
Although the laws themselves—modeled substantially on United States and European 
environmental laws—are relatively complete and comprehensive, difficulties in 
implementation and particularly enforcement have led to the continued deterioration of 
China’s environment.  These failures in implementation and enforcement of 
environmental laws emerge from numerous factors, most notably from the decentralized 
structure of China’s environmental protection agency, from China’s underdeveloped legal 
system, and from the country’s insistent prioritization of continued economic growth over 
environmental protection. 
These factors constitute significant obstacles to effective environmental protection, 
but approaches based in public interest litigation and public participation currently 
provide the most viable methods for increasing the efficacy of Chinese environmental 
laws.  Accordingly, an approach that incorporates both public participation and public 
interest litigation, similar to the qui tam system used in the United States, may prove 
especially effective in bolstering Chinese environmental protection.  In essence, qui tam 
actions combine both citizen assistance and government-led litigation to prosecute 
wrongdoings.  Under such a system that combines elements of public participation with 
government-led public interest litigation, China’s central government will have the 
authority to prosecute civil environmental lawsuits filed by private citizens on behalf of 
the government, thereby creating a potentially powerful tool for Chinese environmental 
protection. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, no nation has emerged as a major industrial and 
economic power without inflicting substantial environmental damage.1  In 
recent years China has also followed this trend, but on an entirely 
unparalleled scale.2  Over the past two decades China has experienced 
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unprecedented economic growth;3 unfortunately, this torrid growth has also 
been accompanied by unprecedented environmental degradation.4  Unlike 
previous nations that caused environmental damage at a more modest rate on 
their marches toward economic strength, China has incurred severe 
environmental costs well before the maturation of its economic 
development.  As such, China is essentially “a teenage smoker with 
emphysema.”5 
The deterioration of China’s environment has been severe, pervasive, 
and unrelenting.  China is commonly considered to have the worst urban air 
pollution in the world,6 and a 2005 World Bank study found that sixteen of 
the world’s most polluted cities are in China.7  Only one percent of China’s 
560 million urban residents breathe air considered safe by the European 
Union,8 and the Chinese Ministry of Health says that pollution has made 
cancer the leading cause of death in the country.9  Additionally, 300 million 
Chinese citizens, approximately the population of the United States, lack 
access to safe drinking water.10 
Catastrophic environmental accidents are also relatively common.  
One of the most serious accidents occurred in late 2005 when a chemical 
plant explosion dumped more than 100 tons of the toxic chemical benzene 
into the Songhua River11 and left millions of people without running water 
for several days.12  Over 100 chemical plants situated on the banks of 
China’s rivers still pose a serious threat to drinking water and may 
potentially lead to widespread chemical contamination.13 
China’s severe environmental problems also extend to other parts of 
the world.  Chinese air pollution manifests as acid rain over South Korea and 
                                           
3
 Cynthia W. Cann, Michael C. Cann & Gao Shangquan, China’s Road to Sustainable 
Development: An Overview, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 3, 3 (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005). 
4
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8
 Kahn & Yardley, supra note 1. 
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 Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. 
J. ENVTL. L. 195, 200 (2007). 
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 Wang Xiangwei, Mainland’s Environmental Chief Sacked Over Toxic Chemical Spill, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Dec. 3, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Mainland’s Environmental Chief Sacked]. 
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 David Lague, Water Crisis Shows China’s Pollution Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at A6. 
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 Ching-Ching Ni, China Finds Chemical Plants Pose Widespread Risk to Rivers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2006, at A3. 
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Japan.14  Desertification in China has been severe15 and has led to increased 
sand and dust storms that travel to South Korea and Japan.16  Additionally, a 
significant amount of pollution in the United States can be attributed to 
China,17 including more than a quarter of the atmospheric pollution over Los 
Angeles, California.18  In fact, environmental experts predict that China will 
eventually account for one-third of the air pollution in the entire state of 
California.19  Environmental accidents have also directly impacted other 
countries.  In the Songhua River case, because the Songhua flows into the 
Heilong River that eventually becomes Russia’s Amur River, the toxic 
chemicals ultimately contaminated Russian waters. 20 
Much of China’s explosive economic growth over the past few 
decades emerged from the country’s adoption of the xian wuran, hou zhili, 
or “pollute first, control later,” model of economic development.21  This 
model of development has been followed in the past by other countries such 
as the United States (“U.S.”), Japan, and the United Kingdom (“UK”),22 but 
each of these countries was able to effectively address the consequent 
environmental degradation after their respective economies matured.23  As 
mentioned above, however, China’s situation is unique in that the nation 
faces the consequences of severe environmental degradation well before 
economic maturation and as it continues to strive for maximum economic 
growth.  Furthermore, China also faces a unique predicament in that it first 
established a working legal system after the demise of Mao Zedong’s 
Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s;24 consequently, the country’s legal 
system is still relatively young and underdeveloped.  Additionally, the 
decentralized structure of China’s environmental regulatory system serves to 
impede the country’s environmental protection efforts.25  Thus, China faces 
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serious economic, legal, and administrative barriers to effective 
environmental protection. 
In light of these formidable barriers, approaches based in public 
interest litigation and public participation in environmental protection efforts 
may provide the most viable methods for enhancing Chinese environmental 
protection overall.  In particular, an approach that incorporates both public 
participation and public interest litigation, inspired by qui tam actions used 
in the United States, may prove effective in strengthening Chinese 
environmental protection.  Qui tam actions in the United States are most 
commonly brought under the False Claims Act and are statutorily-authorized 
actions that allow the government to prosecute civil claims filed “in the 
name of the Government” by private parties.26  Thus, the United States’ qui 
tam system, which combines citizen assistance and government-led 
litigation, provides a framework for the establishment of a similar system in 
China in the environmental context.  Under the qui tam system, China’s 
central government will have the authority to prosecute civil environmental 
lawsuits filed by private citizens.  Such a system will constitute a small but 
important step towards achieving effective environmental protection in 
China. 
This Comment will identify deficiencies in China’s environmental 
legal framework and recommend a solution based on public participation 
and public interest litigation to help combat China’s environmental 
degradation.  Part II of this Comment discusses China’s current 
environmental legal framework and how weak implementation and 
enforcement of laws have led to inadequate environmental protection.  Part 
III presents the reasons behind the inefficacies of the environmental legal 
framework.  Part IV suggests that enhanced public participation in 
environmental protection and public interest litigation are currently the most 
viable methods to overcome the inefficacies of China’s environmental laws.  
Part V proposes the adoption of a law to establish such a system, inspired by 
the qui tam system in the United States, that combines both government-led 
litigation with elements of public participation and expressly allows China’s 
central government to prosecute civil environmental lawsuits filed by private 
citizens. 
                                           
26
 Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 769 (2000). 
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II. CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS TO ADEQUATELY 
PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
China has created a comprehensive and complete body of 
environmental laws over the past three decades.  Although shortcomings in 
some legislation have hindered environmental protection to an extent, these 
shortcomings are relatively minor compared to the major weakness in 
Chinese environmental law:  lax implementation and enforcement of 
environmental laws. 
A. China’s Environmental Laws Are, for the Most Part, Complete and 
Comprehensive 
China’s environmental legal framework consists primarily of four 
levels:  1) China’s Constitution; 2) laws enacted by the National People’s 
Congress (“NPC”) and the Standing Committee; 3) binding regulations, 
orders, decisions, and other documents promulgated by the State Council 
(here, through the State Environmental Protection Administration); and 4) 
regulations, decisions, and orders promulgated by provinces, autonomous 
regions, and municipalities directly under the central government.27 
China’s body of environmental laws began with limited provisions 
involving the environment in the 1978 Constitution. 28  These provisions 
were subsequently revised and strengthened through the 1982 amendments 
to the Constitution.29  Currently, Article 9 of the Constitution provides that 
“[t]he state ensures the rational use of natural resources and protects rare 
animals and plants” and that “[t]he appropriation or damage of natural 
resources by any organization or individual by whatever means is 
prohibited.”30  Furthermore, Article 26 of the Constitution provides that 
“[t]he state protects and improves the living environment and the ecological 
environment, and prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards” 
and that “[t]he state organizes and encourages afforestation and the 
protection of forests.”31 
In 1979, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee enacted 
the Environmental Protection Law (“EPL”), the nation’s first targeted 
                                           
27
 Hannam & Qun, supra note 16, at 319. 
28
 Sitaraman, supra note 24, at 293. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Consititution of the People’s Republic of China, Ch. II General Principles, art. 9 (1982), available 
at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. 
31
 Id. art. 26. 
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environmental statute.32  The EPL was first introduced for trial 
implementation in 1979, then significantly revised before its adoption in 
1989.33  The statute “was prepared as a general environmental law focusing 
on pollution control . . . [and] the law is potentially applicable to all 
pollution-generating activities.”34  Thus, the EPL essentially acts as a general 
“catch-all” for environmental protection.35  In practice, however, the 
provisions of the EPL are aspirational in nature, as it “establishes 
fundamental concepts for environmental protection that often are reflected in 
subsequently adopted laws.”36  Among other things, it grants individual 
citizens the right to “report on or file charges against units or individuals that 
cause pollution or damage to the environment,”37 grants “awards to units and 
individuals that have made outstanding achievements in protecting and 
improving the environment,”38 establishes environmental monitoring 
systems under the State Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”) 
and local Environmental Protection Bureaus (“EPBs”),39 requires the use of 
environmental impact statements on new construction projects,40 stipulates 
that enterprises or institutions that cause severe environmental pollution 
shall be required to eliminate and control the pollution within a certain 
period of time,41 and describes the legal liabilities of violators.42  Perhaps 
most significantly, the EPL retroactively provided a solid legislative base for 
many of the environmental regulatory programs first developed during the 
1970s and 1980s, and also extended responsibility for environmental 
protection to governing bodies at the national, provincial, county, and city 
levels.43  Although the practical value of the EPL has been rather minimal (to 
pollution victims, for example), the statute acted as a catalyst for a wide 
range of subsequent environmental statutes—most of which emerged from 
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 Richard J. Ferris Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Environmental Law in the People’s Republic of China, in 
CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 66, 76 (Kristen A. Day ed., 
2005). 
33
 Sitaraman, supra note 24, at 294. 
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 Ferris & Zhang, supra note 32, at 76. 
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 See generally Environmental Protection Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s 
Cong. Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/ 
environment/34356.htm (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Environmental Protection Law]. 
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 Ferris & Zhang, supra note 32, at 76. 
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 Id. art. 8. 
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 Id. art. 13. 
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 See id. arts. 35-45. 
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 XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, 
ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 16 (2000). 
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the general provisions of the EPL but were more specific and narrowly-
focused in content.44 
These more narrowly-tailored environmental laws include statutes 
concerning water pollution, marine environment, fisheries, solid waste, 
atmospheric pollution, wildlife, radioactive pollution, and environmental 
impact assessments (“EIA”) for new construction projects.45  Of particular 
importance is the EIA statute.  Although the EPL discusses EIAs generally, 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Appraising of Environmental 
Impacts (2003) delved into great detail on the EIA process and, notably, 
included public participation as an element of project approvals.46  As such, 
the enactment of the EIA statute “marked a watershed moment for public 
participation in China, as public involvement became a required component 
of the environmental decision-making process.”47 
In addition to the creation of environmental statutes, China amended 
the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China in 1997 to attach 
criminal liability to certain environmental violations.48  One section, 
“Crimes of Impairing the Protection of the Environment and Resources,” 
details major violations subject to criminal liability including serious 
pollution accidents,49 illegally importing or treating imported solid waste,50 
illegally catching or killing protected wildlife,51 and illegal mining.52  The 
law also assigns specific ranges of prison terms for each violation.53 
China also participates in various international conventions and 
treaties on environmental protection,54 including the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.55  Such accords “often provide 
                                           
44
 See Adam Briggs, Note, China's Pollution Victims: Still Seeking a Dependable Remedy, 18 GEO. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 309 (2006); see Ferris & Zhang, supra note 32, at 79. 
45
 Sitaraman, supra note 24, at 296. 
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 Law on Appraising of Environmental Impacts (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s 
Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/ 
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47
 Jesse L. Moorman & Zhang Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s 
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L. 281, 282 (2007); see also infra Part IV.A (giving examples of public participation). 
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 CRIMINAL LAW, Ch. VI, Section VI (adopted by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Jul. 1, 1979, revised 
Mar. 14, 1997), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/criminalLawENG.php (P.R.C). 
49
 Id. art. 338. 
50
 Id. art. 339. 
51
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52
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54
 Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested 
Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 159, 163 (2007). 
55
 Ferris & Zhang, supra note 32, at 76. 
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needed financial and other support to develop and implement domestic 
environmental laws.”56 
The final major component of China’s environmental legal framework 
is SEPA, China’s centralized environmental agency comparable to the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).57  In 1998 the 
Chinese Premier elevated SEPA to the ministerial level within the State 
Council in an attempt to demonstrate and solidify the agency’s authority 
over environmental protection to the general public.58  Similarly, in March 
2008 China announced plans to reorganize the central government by, 
among other things, transforming SEPA into one of five so-called 
“superministries.”  Created to improve bureaucratic efficiency, this move 
will presumably enhance SEPA’s clout within the central government.59  
SEPA’s formal duties include promulgating environmental laws, creating 
environmental policy, and formulating specific regulations concerning 
environmental protection.60  SEPA also monitors environmental compliance 
through provincial, municipal, and local EPBs and Environmental 
Monitoring Centers throughout China.61  Local EPBs are tasked with 
implementing and enforcing SEPA’s environmental laws and regulations.62  
Additionally, local EPBs are responsible for overseeing EIAs for new 
projects (although some EIAs require SEPA approval), monitoring local 
emissions, assessing fines for pollution discharges that exceed state 
standards, and pursuing legal action against those who consistently fail to 
meet pollution standards.63 
Thus, China’s environmental legal framework is relatively complete, 
broad in coverage, and comprehensive.64  Some of the environmental laws, 
however, may suffer from certain weaknesses.  For example, certain laws 
contain vague language and are often more similar to policy statements than 
authoritative mandates.  These provisions “encourage” rather than require 
compliance, and frequently contain very weak enforcement provisions.65  
Still, such statutory weaknesses are relatively minor when compared to 
                                           
56
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57
 Sitaraman, supra note 24, at 305. 
58
 Briggs, supra note 44, at 310. 
59
 Jim Yardly, China Retools Its Government in a Push for Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at 
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60
 Sitaraman, supra note 24, at 305. 
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 Id. at 306. 
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 Elizabeth Economy, Environmental Enforcement in China, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 102, 103 (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005). 
64
 See Sitaraman, supra note 24, at 295-98. 
65
 Wang, supra note 10, at 203. 
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China’s serious problems with implementation and enforcement of 
environmental laws and present a far less formidable barrier to effective 
environmental protection. 
B. Chinese Environmental Protection Suffers from a Lack of Effective 
Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
China’s primary challenge in environmental protection lies in the 
implementation and enforcement of its environmental laws.  One of the 
weakest areas of implementation and enforcement involves SEPA and the 
EPBs.  SEPA and its local EPBs frequently fail to enforce environmental 
laws against local enterprises.  Such failures are exemplified by the 
numerous small chemical factories along the banks of China’s Tonglang 
River.  These factories had continually discharged acid wastewater into the 
river for many years before the EPB finally ordered the factories to stop 
production in 2004.66  Although local EPBs were aware of the factories’ 
activities long before 2004, they declined to take action against the factories 
because a stop in production would seriously harm the local economy and 
most of the livelihoods in the area.67  Similarly, in 1997 a number of 
residents in Tangshan who lived near a polluting factory began developing 
skin conditions and even leukemia; the local government officially 
acknowledged that the plant released toxic pollutants such as benzene into 
the area, but only issued a fine against the plant and allowed it to continue 
polluting.68 
Another example of SEPA’s and the EPBs’ failure to implement and 
enforce environmental statutes is illustrated by the EIA statute.  
Environmental officials often decline to fully implement or enforce the EIA 
law.  There are numerous instances of EIA officials approving projects that 
do not comply with EIA requirements, as well as cases of officials reporting 
false information on EIA statements in order to allow construction.69  For 
instance, one such report stated that the distance between a proposed plant 
and residential area was 400 meters, while the actual distance was twenty 
meters.70  SEPA approved the construction, and the project subsequently 
inflicted severe pollution.71 
                                           
66
 VAN ROOIJ, supra note 7, at 192-95. 
67
 Id. at 193. 
68
 Briggs, supra note 44, at 315. 
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 Wang Canfa, supra note 54, at 166. 
70
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 Id. at 166-67. 
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Another area of ineffective enforcement involves criminal liability for 
environmental violations.  As discussed above, China amended its criminal 
code in 1997 to include environmental crimes and to punish environmental 
polluters.72  These criminal provisions, however, have not been properly 
enforced.  For example, between 1997 and 2002, there were 387 serious 
environmental pollution cases that should have fallen under criminal 
liability; yet less than twenty of these cases were prosecuted.73  Instead, 
EPBs dispensed administrative fines against the polluters rather than any 
criminal penalties.74 
The foregoing illustrations of weak implementation and enforcement 
of environmental laws are a few of the numerous such environmental 
protection failures throughout China.  Such weak implementation and 
enforcement are common and difficult to combat because of the 
decentralized administrative structure of SEPA, weaknesses in the relatively 
new Chinese legal system, and China’s drive to maintain explosive 
economic growth. 
III. STRUCTURAL, LEGAL, AND ECONOMIC BARRIERS PREVENT EFFECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
There exist numerous reasons behind China’s weak enforcement of 
environmental laws.  The most significant factors include 1) the 
decentralized structure of China’s environmental protection agency, 2) the 
underdeveloped Chinese legal system, and 3) the country’s prioritization of 
economic growth and livelihood over environmental protection. 
A. The Decentralized Structure of China’s Environmental Protection 
Agency Presents Serious Challenges to Effective Environmental 
Enforcement 
As discussed above, SEPA generally promulgates environmental laws 
at the national level, while the local EPBs are given the task of enforcing the 
laws.75  This lack of centralized enforcement power on the part of SEPA is to 
be expected, given the sheer size and population of China, and parallels 
some of the structural issues inherent in China’s government as a whole.  In 
theory China’s government operates as a unitary state with power centralized 
                                           
72
 See supra Part II.A 
73
 Symposium, China in Transition: Environmental Challenges in the Far East, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 
379, 385 (2007) [hereinafter China in Transition]. 
74
 Id. 
75
 See supra Part II.A. 
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in Beijing.76  In reality, the national government issues broad guidelines, and 
subnational and local governments possess considerable discretion in 
interpreting, implementing, and enforcing national mandates.77  As such, 
SEPA’s similar structure reinforces the sentiment of many citizens regarding 
the efficacy of the central government as a whole that “[t]he mountains are 
high, and the emperor is far away.”78 
The extensive devolution of enforcement authority to local 
administrative levels has led to the inability of the national agency to enforce 
environmental laws effectively.  SEPA’s structure gives local agencies 
implementation and enforcement authority over most day-to-day 
environmental issues, which leaves the central agency with little authority 
over implementing and enforcing specific laws at the local level.79  Thus, 
local EPBs have significant leeway and independence in interpreting and 
enforcing SEPA mandates.80  The local environmental agencies, however, 
are often unwilling to vigorously enforce environmental mandates from the 
central government,81 generally because of local protectionism—local 
governments protecting local economic, political, and social interests82—and 
sometimes because of corruption.83  This problem emerges in large part from 
the fact that local EPBs receive most or all of their funding from local 
governments.  Neither SEPA nor the central government provides much, if 
any, funding for the EPBs’ environmental enforcement operations.84  Thus, a 
local government is able to exercise influence over the EPB through its 
budgetary control and prioritize local economic considerations over 
environmental protection.  Additionally, corrupt and ambitious EPB officials 
may engage in lax environmental enforcement at the behest of local 
governments, as the decisions involving promotions and career advancement 
are made by these local governments.85  As a result, local governments exert 
significant influence over the bureaus,86  EPB officials are often susceptible 
to pressures from local governments to enforce environmental laws less 
                                           
76
 See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL 
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stringently,87 and the EPBs’ loyalties more often lie with the local 
governments rather than the national government.88 
Additionally, SEPA (the centralized agency) is often unable to fully 
enforce environmental laws at the local level because it is “deficient in size, 
authority, and institutional capacity to successfully assert control over local 
environmental agencies.”89  Although SEPA has attempted to support the 
enforcement activities of the EPBs, its aforementioned deficiencies have 
rendered many of these attempts unsuccessful.90 
B. China’s Relatively New Legal System Is a Major Reason for the Weak 
Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
Historically, China was governed primarily through personal 
relationships or guanxi (social connections).91  The legal history of China 
suggests that law was always viewed as an instrument for social control, 
rather than a tool to empower the individual against the state:  “[L]aw 
was . . . viewed as a mechanism to prevent China's citizens from rebelling or 
challenging the supremacy of the state.”92  As such, the country has no 
tradition or legal culture of using lawyers, courts, or the law to redress 
injustices or resolve disputes.93  Although China had once established an 
underdeveloped and sporadically-utilized legal regime during the 
Republican and Nationalist era (1911-1948), the advent of Mao Zedong’s 
rule brought forth the complete obliteration of this fledgling legal system.94  
China did not begin reestablishing a genuine legal regime until the demise of 
Mao and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s.95  Post-Mao, China faced 
the immense legislative challenge of reestablishing, or truly establishing for 
the first time, the largest legal system in the world.96 
In part because of its relatively nascent nature, China’s legal system 
suffers from significant weaknesses.  Genuine power and authority lie 
primarily within the Communist Party, despite the introduction of a body of 
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law.97  As such, China possesses a weak judiciary system.98  Chinese citizens 
often cannot look to the judiciary to force the government to implement or 
enforce laws, as the judiciary is not independent of other governing bodies.  
Judges are both funded99 and appointed by local governments.100  
Consequently, judges must answer to their respective local governments that 
may regularly intervene in cases involving financially beneficial polluting 
enterprises.101  Furthermore, judges must also undergo annual political 
training, “which further undercuts their independence and the likelihood that 
they will make a decision that is contrary to official doctrine,”102 and judges 
are often poorly trained.103  In the Chinese legal system, “the legislator is the 
almighty entity within the State, without a system of checks and 
balances.”104  This political structure often “makes [it] impossible for a 
Chinese court to declare a statute or even a local set of regulations invalid or 
unconstitutional”105 and often renders the judiciary ineffective.  In other 
words, the legislative body—rather than the courts—have the authority to 
create, modify, and interpret legal rules.106  Furthermore, although governing 
bodies at the national level (such as SEPA) are responsible for interpreting 
national laws and local laws that implement national laws,107 the national 
government is generally reluctant to issue written interpretations of laws.108  
This reluctance only adds to the ambiguity and uncertainty of the legal 
system.109 
There are signs, however, that China is committed to strengthening its 
legal system.  In the past few years the government elite has been guiding 
the transition from China’s political-legal system towards a system that 
emphasizes the rule of law and reduced interference of administrative and 
judicial processes by the Communist Party.110  For instance, the practice of 
procuring outside resources (such as the international community) to assist 
with research, training, and other such matters related to strengthening the 
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“rules-of-law” is becoming quite commonplace and accepted by the top 
governmental bodies.111  Also, China’s leaders increasingly advocate “ruling 
the country according to law” and even amended the Constitution in 1999 to 
include this rule of law principle.112  Furthermore, the Chinese government’s 
reluctance concerning written interpretations of laws has diminished 
somewhat:  “Requests for written interpretations, reliance on existing written 
interpretations, and exchanges of letters confirming that a compliance 
approach described by the company or other stakeholder is acceptable to 
authorities are increasing at certain agencies in China.”113  China appears to 
be gradually strengthening its legal system by reducing ambiguity and 
vagueness of broadly drafted laws114 (through issuing interpretations, for 
example) and demonstrating its commitment to a genuine legal regime. 
C. The Prioritization of Economic Growth and Livelihood over 
Environmental Protection Acts as a Formidable Barrier Against 
Effective Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
China’s intense focus on economic development over the past twenty 
to thirty years has resulted in remarkable economic growth.  In 1978 China 
was the forty-eighth largest economy in the world; in 2005 China was the 
fourth largest economy in the world behind only the United States, Japan, 
and Germany.115  Impressively, during this twenty-seven year period, 
China’s gross domestic product increased by an average of 9.4% every 
year.116  During this period of torrid economic growth, China also vastly 
reduced the number of people living in poverty,117 thereby enhancing 
economic livelihood. 
Because of China’s runaway economic success, the country tends to 
prioritize economic growth and livelihood over environmental protection, 
both at the central level and especially at the local level.118  Pan Yue, the 
deputy minister of SEPA, stated in an interview:  “[t]he main reason behind 
the continued deterioration of the environment is a mistaken view of what 
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counts as political achievement . . . . The crazy expansion of high-polluting, 
high-energy industries has spawned special interests.  Protected by local 
governments, some businesses treat the natural resources that belong to all 
the people as their own private property.”119  Local protectionism rears its 
head once again.  Because local governments often pursue economic growth 
and livelihood over environmental protection,120 these local governments 
apply heavy pressure on EPBs to regulate economically valuable polluting 
enterprises less stringently.  Thus, many local governments, with EPB 
cooperation, often ignore environmental laws and edicts by reopening mines 
or factories that were closed for pollution violations by the central 
government121 and by allowing severely polluting enterprises to continue 
operations.122 
The local governments’ emphasis on economic growth and livelihood 
is further demonstrated by the fact that a municipality’s worst polluter is 
often also its principal employer and largest source of revenue.123  
Consequently, local governments tend to prioritize such revenues over 
environmental protection and pressure local EPBs to limit their enforcement 
of environmental laws against polluting enterprises.124  There are also 
instances where local governments appear to enforce penalties against 
polluters without imposing any actual penalties:  “[i]t is no rarity . . . to find 
a bureau imposing a fine on a dirty local enterprise (thus fulfilling its duty), 
but then passing the money on to the local administration, which refunds it 
to the company via a tax break.”125 
China’s tendency to prioritize economic growth and livelihood over 
environmental protection acts as a significant obstacle to effective 
enforcement of environmental laws. 
IV. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION WILL LEAD 
TO MORE EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
As discussed above, structural, legal, and economic barriers currently 
hinder the efficacy of China’s environmental laws.  Because these barriers 
are formidable, public participation and public interest litigation may 
currently constitute two of the most viable options for enhancing Chinese 
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environmental protection.  In particular, a system that incorporates both 
public participation and public interest litigation may prove especially 
effective. 
A. Increasing Public Participation in Environmental Protection Efforts 
Will Enhance Environmental Protection in China 
The enhancement of public participation in environmental protection 
efforts has great value for improving the efficacy of Chinese environmental 
laws and is one of the most promising ways to overcome the foregoing legal, 
governmental, and economic barriers to achieve effective environmental 
protection.  Such public participation allows citizens to contribute to the 
efforts of the government in producing higher quality decisions on the 
environment.126  There are also other benefits of public participation 
including enhanced public education and governmental transparency and 
accountability.127  As such, enhanced public participation will lead to “a 
system capable of producing knowledgeable and inclusive environmental 
decisions.”128  Additionally, public participation can serve to ameliorate 
SEPA’s deficiencies in regulatory and supervisory oversight that emerge 
from its limited resources of money and manpower.129  For example, citizens 
possess intimate knowledge of local environmental violations and can notify 
government officials while simultaneously heightening awareness of local 
environmental issues.130  In this manner, public participation can also act to 
maximize limited government resources by assisting SEPA with its 
monitoring and enforcement efforts, thereby saving SEPA time and 
money.131 
In recent years, “there has been a dramatic upsurge in both the level of 
interest and the level of involvement among the Chinese public in improving 
the environment.”132  Some examples of recent public participation activities 
have included formal involvement by the public in environmental non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and “mass-based” environmental 
programs such as battery recycling or tree planting.133  Another example of 
public participation, as mentioned earlier, emerges from the environmental 
impact assessment statute that generally requires public participation 
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through “demonstration meetings, hearings, or by any other means.”134  A 
recent example of such EIA-based public participation transpired in 
December 2007 in the city of Xiamen, where the government proposed 
construction of a power plant that could pose serious dangers to the 
environment and public health.135  The proposal sparked passionate protests 
by Xiamen citizens, many of whom voiced their opposition to the project at 
rare public hearings held by the city government136—hearings that are 
required, with few exceptions, by the EIA statute.137  The public’s 
participation in the EIA process ultimately forced the city to suspend its 
construction of the toxic chemical plant.138 
Additionally, the lodging of citizen complaints to environmental 
officials, through which the public “acts as a watchdog,” is one of the most 
common forms of public participation in environmental protection.139  In 
1996, for example, environmental officials received over 67,000 letters of 
complaint regarding environmental pollution; in 1998, this number increased 
to 241,321.140  In fact, “local environmental officials state that many of their 
best tips for polluting enterprises come from such letters and phone calls.”141  
The individual local environmental agencies, of course, cannot (or will not) 
address all complaints, in which case complainants may take legal action to 
enjoin or seek compensation from violators of environmental laws.142  Such 
legal recourse, however, can be difficult to pursue and attain because, as the 
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next section discusses, potential plaintiffs face various obstacles within 
China’s traditional system of environmental litigation. 
B. Public Interest Litigation Will Buttress Traditional Environmental 
Litigation Resulting in Enhanced Environmental Protection 
Environmental litigation in China consists mainly of pollution 
compensation litigation, in which plaintiffs seek compensation for harm 
caused by pollution.143  Pollution compensation lawsuits are authorized by 
two statutes:  the General Principles of Civil Law and the EPL.144  Article 
124 of the General Principles of Civil Law provides that “[a]ny person who 
pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in violation of state 
provisions for environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall 
bear civil liability in accordance with the law.”145  Article 41 of the EPL 
provides that “[a] unit that has caused an environmental pollution hazard 
shall have the obligation to eliminate it and make compensation to the unit 
or individual that suffered direct losses.”146 
Traditional environmental litigation, however, presents formidable 
obstacles to potential plaintiffs.  One such obstacle is the high (often 
prohibitively high) cost of litigation for plaintiffs.  Chinese law requires 
plaintiffs to pay a case acceptance fee–a percentage of the requested relief.147  
Also, courts often levy “other litigation costs” against plaintiffs; because 
these costs are imposed at the court’s discretion, such “other litigation costs” 
can often be “a source of abuse.”148  Furthermore, in cases where the losing 
defendant fails to pay the court-ordered amount, the plaintiff is required to 
pay fees to initiate “execution proceedings” to compel the defendant’s 
payment.149  Additionally, plaintiffs must pay for appraisals, executed by 
court-appointed certified experts, which provide material evidence of 
violations, causation, and appropriate damages.150  Such appraisal fees can 
be extremely costly, sometimes even equivalent to “many years of salary for 
an average individual in China.”151  Thus, the high costs imposed on 
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plaintiffs in traditional environmental litigation has the effect of 
discouraging potential plaintiffs from filing lawsuits, particularly those 
potential plaintiffs from more rural areas. 
Traditional environmental litigation also suffers from barriers 
presented by a familiar theme in Chinese environmental law:  local 
protectionism.  Local protectionism can discourage potential plaintiffs from 
filing environmental lawsuits because of 1) local pressures and threats 
imposed on plaintiffs themselves and 2) the local government’s influence 
over its courts.152  Local governments, as well as many local citizens, often 
seek to protect polluting enterprises from closure or heavy fines because 
such enterprises may be of great economic value to both local governments 
and individual citizens.153  As such, there have been instances of threats and 
harassment towards plaintiffs bringing suit against local polluting 
enterprises.  In one such case, locals assaulted the plaintiff when he was 
collecting water samples for evidence and also assaulted his wife at their 
home; the local government also closed the plaintiff’s health clinic.154 
Protectionism also often extends to local courts, as local governments 
have control over both personnel and budgetary decisions of the courts.155  
As Wang Canfa, a prominent Chinese environmental law activist, has stated, 
“[i]f people in the provinces try to sue these companies, they come up 
against courts which are not very independent because they are influenced 
by local governments.  Even if the [plaintiffs] are right, they often lose the 
case.”156  Thus, plaintiffs can face powerful community and governmental 
pressures and judicial barriers in pursuing traditional environmental 
litigation, and these obstacles often serve to deter potential plaintiffs from 
filing lawsuits against local violators.  Accordingly, an additional layer of 
environmental litigation via public interest litigation may constitute an 
effective alternative for seeking relief by bypassing the obstacles in 
traditional environmental litigation. 
In December 2005, the State Council declared that “public interest 
litigation” was a favored tool for environmental protection157—although the 
government has yet to establish a legal framework for public interest 
litigation.158  Public interest litigation, broadly defined as litigation brought 
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to protect “the general welfare of the public”159 (i.e., on behalf of the “public 
interest”), would “address many of the barriers found in traditional pollution 
compensation litigation,”160 such as the high cost of litigation and reluctance 
of individual citizens to bring suit against local enterprises,161 and Chinese 
environmental law in general.  Although weaknesses in the Chinese court 
system may continue to affect public interest litigation cases and even where 
these cases are unsuccessful, litigation can often serve “as a catalyst to 
negotiated solutions or government enforcement.”162  In one such case, 
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against an EPB in Hebei Province that had approved 
the polluting operations of a local factory; the case was ultimately dismissed 
by two local courts for lack of standing.163  The plaintiffs, however, used the 
case to bring attention to gross misstatements in the factory’s environmental 
impact statement (“EIS”).164  SEPA ultimately invalidated the factory’s EIS 
and shut down its operations.165  Similarly, public interest litigation may 
assist governmental enforcement of Chinese environmental laws by 
supplementing enforcement measures and supervising disinclined 
government agencies (e.g., certain EPBs) and officials and by providing an 
additional resource for environmental protection to SEPA, a regulatory entity 
with already scarce resources. 
Accordingly, both public participation and public interest litigation 
stand out as two of the currently most viable methods for enhancing Chinese 
environmental protection.  Thus, a solution consisting of both public interest 
litigation and elements of public participation may prove especially effective 
for strengthening China’s environmental protection and ultimately 
combating the country’s severe environmental degradation. 
V. QUI TAM ACTIONS WILL ALLOW THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO 
PROSECUTE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWSUITS FILED BY PRIVATE CITIZENS 
Chinese environmental legal scholars have proposed several solutions 
pertaining to public interest litigation, including the express statutory 
establishment of the procuratorate (roughly equivalent to prosecutors in the 
United States) as a permissible plaintiff in civil and administrative 
environmental lawsuits.166  Such a provision is not expressly stated in law, 
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but the procuratorates in China have initiated or prosecuted a small handful 
of civil lawsuits against polluting enterprises with some success.167  For 
example, in 2004 the Yan Jiang Procuratorate in Sichuan Province gave 
official warning to a seriously polluting enterprise—after the local EPB 
failed to stop the factory’s pollution and after local citizens declined to sue 
due to litigation costs—to either cease its polluting activities or face a civil 
lawsuit brought by the procuratorate.168  Procuratorates from several other 
provinces have also brought civil environmental lawsuits against polluting 
enterprises in the past decade or so, although “such cases to date have 
always been ‘bootstrapped’ onto criminal suits that are clearly within the 
current legal authority of the procuratorate.”169  Although the instances are 
few, government-led public interest litigation appears to be a promising 
avenue for enhanced environmental protection.  Procuratorate-led public 
interest litigation, however, may still be subject to local protectionism; thus, 
a better solution may be found in public interest litigation led by an entity of 
the central government, namely SEPA.  Such a system would help limit the 
effects of local protectionism by essentially eliminating possible loyalties to 
a local government. 
China should not, however, limit itself solely to government-led 
public interest litigation.  Rather, “a system that allows both government and 
public litigation to protect the environment would . . . be optimal.”170  One 
way of establishing government-led public interest litigation with a measure 
of public participatory elements is through a statutory provision of qui tam 
actions, modeled on the qui tam system in the United States, for civil 
environmental lawsuits.  Thus, as detailed in the following section, China 
should adopt a new law or amend an existing law to establish a similar qui 
tam system that allows the central government to prosecute civil 
environmental lawsuits filed by private citizens. 
A. The Qui Tam Process in the United States Provides a Viable 
Framework for Increased Citizen Involvement and Government-Led 
Public Interest Litigation in China 
In the United States, qui tam actions are statutorily authorized actions 
most commonly brought under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).171  The FCA 
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“imposes civil liability upon any person who . . . knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States 
Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”172  
Originating from British legal tradition,173 qui tam is short for the Latin 
phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur—
“who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his 
own”—and under the FCA, qui tam actions allow the government itself to 
bring a civil suit against the alleged false claimant174 or, alternatively, a 
private person to bring suit, “in the name of the Government,”175 on behalf 
of him or herself and the United States.176  Specifically regarding actions 
brought by private persons, a qui tam action is an action “brought on behalf 
of the government by a private party who receives some part of the recovery 
awarded as compensation for his efforts.”177  The private person is also 
called a “relator.”178  In very general terms, the qui tam action is a statutory 
method for the government to seek citizen assistance to fight injustice or 
crime.179 
Under the FCA, a relator who initiates an action submits “[a] copy of 
the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence 
and information the person possesses” to the government, specifically the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).180  The complaint is filed in camera and 
remains under seal for at least sixty days.181  The government may then 
“elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60 days after it 
receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information.”182  
If the government chooses to intervene, it assumes primary responsibility for 
prosecuting the action.183  The relator, however, “may continue to participate 
in the litigation and is entitled to a hearing before voluntary dismissal and to 
a court determination of reasonableness before settlement.”184  If the 
government declines to pursue the action within sixty days of receiving the 
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complaint and material evidence and information, “the relator has the 
exclusive right to conduct the action . . . and the Government may 
subsequently intervene only on a showing of good cause.”185  If the 
government pursues and successfully prosecutes the claim, the relator 
generally receives “at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the 
proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent 
to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the 
action.”186  If the government declines to pursue the relator’s claim, the 
relator “shall receive an amount which the court decides is reasonable for 
collecting the civil penalty and damages.  The amount shall be not less than 
25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or 
settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds,” plus attorney’s fees and 
costs.187 
Although establishment of a qui tam process identical to that of the 
United States would likely be unworkable and ill-advised, a modified 
version of the government-led qui tam action, with its citizen assistance 
element, should prove effective in buttressing Chinese environmental public 
interest litigation and enhancing environmental protection overall. 
B. Adopting a Modified Version of the Qui Tam Process Will Enhance 
Environmental Litigation and Help Address Inefficacies in China’s 
Environmental Legal Framework 
China may enhance environmental protection by supplementing its 
current system of environmental litigation with public interest litigation.  
One way China can achieve this goal is by adopting a new law or amending 
an existing law188 to establish a qui tam process similar to that of the United 
States189 that employs both the intimate knowledge provided through citizen 
assistance and the resources and efficacy of government-led litigation. 
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1. China Should Incorporate Both Public Participation and 
Government-Led Litigation Through a System Based on the Qui Tam 
Process of the United States 
As discussed above, qui tam actions in the United States are 
authorized under several statutes, most commonly the FCA. 190  The “critical 
factor allowing plaintiffs to sue under the theory of qui tam is the existence 
of a statute specifically authorizing such suit.”191  Thus, in order to 
implement such a framework, it is necessary for China to adopt a new law or 
amend an existing law to specifically authorize qui tam type actions. 
In the creation of such a law, the qui tam system of the United States 
provides a viable framework.  China, however, must take into consideration 
the substantial differences between the two countries when creating its own 
version of qui tam actions.  Some examples of such differences include 
available monetary and personnel resources, overall governmental structure, 
types of administrative agencies, and the legal system.  Accordingly, China 
should create a law that contains similar provisions as the United States’ qui 
tam law,192 but with significant modifications appropriate to the country’s 
unique circumstances. 
First, qui tam actions in China should be filed with SEPA.  SEPA is 
the appropriate body to file such a claim because 1) it is the central agency 
in charge of environmental regulatory oversight and already has the requisite 
knowledge and administrative capability to handle environmental claims; 
and 2) it has recently demonstrated its commitment to stricter environmental 
enforcement, mirroring the “increase in the political will of the central 
government to seriously address environmental problems through legal 
reform.”193  For example, in 2007, SEPA rejected permits for 187 
construction and investment projects worth $91 billion for failing to meet 
environmental impact criteria; in the previous year, SEPA had rejected 110 
projects, and during the period from 1995 to 2005, it had only rejected two 
projects.194  Another such example of SEPA’s stronger commitment to 
environmental enforcement in 2007 was demonstrated by its environmental 
checks on over 220,000 firms, out of which over 8,000 companies were 
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punished for environmental violations.195  Thus, SEPA appears to be 
asserting its authority through its escalating enforcement measures, and this 
assertion may also transfer to the realm of environmental litigation.  There 
are also other specific benefits for filing qui tam actions with SEPA.196 
Additionally, China’s qui tam statute should extend the period of time 
the government has to intervene and pursue an action.  In the United States, 
the DOJ has sixty days to consider and proceed with a qui tam claim.197  In 
China’s case, this statutorily-mandated period must be extended in light of 
SEPA’s comparatively scarce resources and capabilities (including money 
and manpower)198 in order for SEPA to effectively consider and investigate 
the claims. 
China would likely need to decrease the relator’s percentage of the 
award or settlement as compared to the qui tam system in the United States.  
The qui tam process under the FCA “imposes damages essentially punitive 
in nature,”199 and the United States government awards fifteen to thirty 
percent of the final award or settlement to the relator.200  China should lower 
this percentage in light of circumstances unique to its legal system and 
governmental needs.  For instance, punitive damages are generally not 
awarded in traditional environmental litigation cases in China;201 the 
ultimate award in such cases is generally limited to a lower total amount for 
actual and emotional damages,202 along with elimination or control of the 
harmful pollution.203  Because SEPA is in great need of resources, 
particularly money, in order to carry out its current regulatory functions and 
environmental programs204 and will also need resources for such a system of 
government-led public interest litigation, providing relators a decreased 
percentage of the award or settlement (while still maintaining a sufficient 
percentage to motivate relators to file qui tam actions) will allow SEPA to 
retain more funding for its functions. 
On the other hand, China’s qui tam system will need to conform to the 
United States’ version in two important respects.  First, United States qui 
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tam suits are filed in federal court.205  China should adopt a similar 
requirement for its qui tam system and allow the claims to be brought 
beyond the local level, such as in intermediate courts or higher, in order to 
mitigate the effects of local protectionism.  As discussed, protectionism 
occurs in numerous forms, including intense community and governmental 
pressures on plaintiffs and the local governments’ influence over its local 
courts, and often prevents plaintiffs from prevailing in environmental suits 
brought in local courts.206  Such local protectionism is likely to extend even 
to qui tam suits brought by SEPA in local courts; accordingly, China’s qui 
tam statute should allow claims to be brought beyond the local level.  Such a 
requirement is especially recommended in light of evidence that certain 
pollution compensation claims heard in intermediate courts escaped the 
effects of protectionism and resulted in favorable outcomes for the 
plaintiffs.207 
Second, China’s qui tam system should mirror the U.S. system with 
respect to standing for qui tam actions.  The United States confers standing 
on a relator in a qui tam suit even if he or she has not suffered any personal 
injury in fact; such standing is based on the concept that the relator acts as an 
agent of the government that has suffered an injury in fact.208  China will 
need to allow the same standing requirements for relators to maximize the 
efficacy of qui tam actions and to maintain the spirit and purpose of public 
interest litigation. 
2. China Should Establish a Modified Qui Tam Process to Improve 
Deficiencies in Its Environmental Legal Framework in Order to 
Enhance Environmental Protection 
It is important to note that the qui tam process is not a substitute for 
traditional environmental litigation where plaintiffs have suffered personal 
injury in fact and seek full compensation for their injuries.  The qui tam 
action is simply an additional layer of environmental litigation in the form of 
government-led public interest litigation that citizens can pursue to correct 
environmental violations.  One purpose of the qui tam process is to induce 
citizens who have viable legal claims but decline to seek traditional legal 
action to pursue some kind of legal redress.  Thus, although a qui tam 
system in China is an important step towards achieving effective 
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environmental protection, it is not a panacea for China’s environmental ills.  
If China seeks to substantially improve environmental protection, changes 
must occur on a more systemic level beyond the context of environmental 
litigation.  Examples of such changes include—but are not limited to—
substantive reorganization of SEPA’s administrative structure; increased 
funding and personnel for SEPA so as to detach local funding of EPBs and 
increased manpower to carry out SEPA’s duties; increased involvement by 
NGOs and expansion of NGO autonomy in China; increased education and 
citizen awareness of environmental issues; enhancement of judiciary 
independence from local governments; and expansion of standing in 
traditional environmental litigation.  Establishment of a modified qui tam 
statute in China, however, will still serve to combat a number of deficiencies 
in China’s environmental legal system. 
As discussed above, many prospective plaintiffs elect not to bring 
claims through traditional environmental litigation for numerous reasons.209  
For instance, many citizens decline to pursue legal action against polluters 
because of the often prohibitively high litigation costs.  Under a qui tam 
action, however, the high costs of litigation will no longer deter 
complainants, as the government will bear these costs.  This, of course, 
logically raises questions regarding SEPA’s ability to bear such costs, as 
“SEPA is already stretched to the limits of its capacity.”210  This monetary 
consideration, however, may be addressed in two ways. 
First, because a successful qui tam claim will only provide a 
percentage of the final award or settlement to the relator, the remainder of 
the award can go to SEPA to buttress funding for its environmental 
protection functions (including qui tam actions).  Second, frequent 
employment of qui tam actions will demonstrate the willingness of the 
central government to enforce environmental protection measures and may 
have the effect of heightened compliance by polluting enterprises. If this is 
the case, SEPA may be able to decrease its inspections—that some experts 
argue are ineffective211—of local EPBs, thereby reducing costs.  Although 
the Chinese government should still provide additional funding to SEPA for 
the agency to operate more effectively, monetary considerations are unlikely 
to act as a considerable barrier to the viability of a qui tam system. 
Additionally, the qui tam process will, in a sense, expand standing for 
such claims, as relators need not have suffered personal injury in fact to 
bring a qui tam action.  Such an expansion of standing will induce citizens—
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including non-local citizens—who possess material information or evidence 
of serious environmental violations but have not suffered direct personal 
harm to bring legal action,212 especially with the percentage award acting as 
an additional incentive. 
The provision of qui tam actions in Chinese environmental law will 
also help mitigate problems presented by local protectionism with respect to 
environmental lawsuits.  By allowing claims to be filed with courts beyond 
the local level, qui tam actions will remove some of the disadvantages—
emerging from the influence that local governments hold over local courts—
that plaintiffs face in traditional environmental litigation.  This knowledge, 
coupled with evidence that claims have a higher chance of success in courts 
beyond the local level,213 will also have the effect of encouraging more 
citizens to pursue legitimate claims. 
Finally, the various governing bodies of China will likely consider the 
establishment of a modified qui tam system as a more acceptable solution, as 
compared to some other proposals, for enhancing environmental protection.  
Although a number of governing bodies, such as certain divisions of the 
central government, are committed to strong environmental protection 
measures,214 other governing components of China are “principally 
concerned with job growth . . . [and] in maintaining China’s comparative 
advantage as the world’s number one low-cost producer.”215  Thus, the 
government-controlled qui tam system may have a higher chance of 
adoption than more expansive proposals such as the systemic expansion of 
standing for traditional environmental lawsuits, increased NGO 
involvement, or the complete restructuring of SEPA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
China’s explosive economic growth over the past three decades has 
not come without consequence.  The country now faces one of the most 
serious cases of environmental deterioration in history.  China has attempted 
to combat, or at least slow, this degradation through its environmental laws.  
Problems with implementation and enforcement, however, have weakened 
the efficacy of the laws, and China’s environmental regulatory structure, 
relatively new and underdeveloped legal system, and emphasis on economic 
growth have presented serious barriers to effective environmental protection. 
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Currently, in light of the difficulty of overcoming such barriers, 
enhancing public participation in environmental protection efforts and 
establishing public interest litigation may be the most viable methods for 
strengthening China’s environmental protection, thereby alleviating the 
country’s severe environmental degradation.  Specifically, an approach that 
incorporates both public participation and government-led public interest 
litigation may prove especially effective in enhancing Chinese 
environmental litigation and, as a result, protection.  The qui tam system in 
the United States combines both public participation and government-led 
litigation and thus provides a framework for the establishment of a similar 
system in Chinese environmental litigation.  Qui tam actions will allow 
China’s central government to prosecute civil environmental lawsuits filed 
by private citizens and create an effective instrument to enhance 
environmental protection.  The establishment of such a system in China will 
constitute a small but promising step towards effectively regulating the 
“belching dragon.”216 
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